

# Modern Type Theoretical Semantics: Reasoning Using Proof-Assistants

Stergios Chatzikyriakidis

Centre for Linguistic Theory and Studies in Probability, University of Gothenburg

August 27, 2015

# Structure of the talk

- Intro to Modern Type Theoretical Semantics
  - ▶ MTT semantics for NL semantics
    - ★ Some test cases: Modification
  - ▶ Inference Using Proof-Assistant Technology
    - ★ Coq as an NL reasoner
  - ▶ Future work

# A brief intro to Modern Type Theories (MTTs)

- Type Theories within the tradition of Martin L of
  - ▶ In linguistics, this work has been initiated by pioneering work of Ranta (1994)
- Here, we use one such MTT, UTT, first applied by Luo (2010) to the study of linguistic semantics
  - ▶ Two characteristics that are promising in using MTTs as an alternative formal semantics language:
    - ★ Consistent internal logic according to the propositions-as-types principle
    - ★ Rich type structures

# Intro to MTTs-Type Many Sortedness and Rich Typing

- Many-sortedness of types
  - ▶ Use of many types to interpret CNs, *man* and *table*
  - ▶ CNs are interpreted as Types rather than as predicates ( $e \rightarrow t$ )
- Use of Dependent Types  $\Pi$  and  $\Sigma$ 
  - ▶ When  $A$  is a type and  $P$  is a predicate over  $A$ ,  $\Pi x:A.P(x)$  is the dependent function type that stands for the universally quantified proposition  $\forall x:A.P(x)$
  - ▶  $\Pi$  for polymorphic typing:  $\Pi A:CN.(A \rightarrow Prop) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow Prop)$
  - ▶  $A$  is a type and  $B$  is an  $A$ -indexed family of types, then  $\Sigma x:A.B(x)$ , is a type, consisting of pairs  $(a, b)$  such that  $a$  is of type  $A$  and  $b$  is of type  $B(a)$ .
  - ▶ Adjectival modification as involving  $\Sigma$  types (Ranta, 1994; Luo, 2010):  
 $heavybook = \Sigma x : book.heavy(x)$

# Intro to MTTs-Subtyping

- Coercive subtyping
  - ▶ Can be seen as an abbreviation mechanism
    - ★  $A$  is a (proper) subtype of  $B$  ( $A < B$ ) if there is a unique implicit coercion  $c$  from type  $A$  to type  $B$
    - ★ An object  $a$  of type  $A$  can be used in any context  $\mathcal{C}_B[-]$  that expects an object of type  $B$ :  $\mathcal{C}_B[a]$  is legal (well-typed) and equal to  $\mathcal{C}_B[c(a)]$ .
    - ★ For example assuming  $man < human$ ,  $John : man$  and  $shout : human \rightarrow Prop$ , then  $shout(John)$  is well-typed.

# Intro to MTTs-Universes

## • Universes

- ▶ A universe is a collection of (the names of) types into a type (Martin Löf, 1984).
- ▶ Universes can help semantic representations. For example, one may use the universe  $CN$  : *Type* of all common noun interpretations and, for each type  $A$  that interprets a common noun, there is a name  $\overline{A}$  in  $CN$ . For example,

$$\overline{man} : CN \quad \text{and} \quad T_{CN}(\overline{man}) = man.$$

In practice, we do not distinguish a type in  $CN$  and its name by omitting the overlines and the operator  $T_{CN}$  by simply writing, for instance,  $man : CN$ .

# Modification

- Adjectival modification as involving  $\Sigma$  types, in line with Ranta (1994)
  - ▶ Intersective adjectives as simple predicate types and subsective as polymorphic types over the CN universe:
    - ★  $\llbracket \text{black} \rrbracket : \text{Object} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$
    - ★  $\llbracket \text{small} \rrbracket : \Pi A : \text{CN}. A \rightarrow \text{Prop}$  (the  $A$  argument is implicit)
    - ★ For *black man*, we have:  $\Sigma m : \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{black} \rrbracket (m) < \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket$  (via  $\pi_1$ )
    - ★  $< \Sigma m : \llbracket \text{human} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{black} \rrbracket (m)$  (via subtyping propagation)
    - ★  $< \llbracket \text{human} \rrbracket$  (via  $\pi_1$ )
  - ▶ For *small man*:
    - ★  $\Sigma m : \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{small} \rrbracket \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket (m) < \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket$  (via  $\pi_1$ )
    - ★ BUT NOT:  
 $\Sigma m : \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{small} \rrbracket \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket (m) < \Sigma m : \llbracket \text{animal} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{small} \rrbracket \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket (m)$
    - ★ Many instances of *small*:  $\text{small}(\llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket)$  is of type  $\llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket \rightarrow \text{Prop}$ ,  
 $\text{small}(\llbracket \text{animal} \rrbracket)$  is of type  $\llbracket \text{animal} \rrbracket \rightarrow \text{Prop}$

# Adjectival Modification/More Advanced Issues

- Privative adjectives like *fake*

- ▶ We follow Partee (2007) and argue that privative adjectives are actually subsecutive adjectives which operate on CNs with extended denotations

- ★ For exaple, the denotation of *fur* is expanded to include both *real* and *fake* furs:

(1) I don't care whether that fur is fake fur or real fur.

(2) I don't care whether that fur is fake or real.

- ★  $G = G_R + G_F$  with  $inl(r):G_R$  and  $inl(f):G_F$

- ★ Injections as coercions:  $G_R <_{inl} G$  and  $G_F <_{inr} G$  and we define:

$real\_gun(inl(r)) = True$  and  $real\_gun(inr(f)) = False$ ;

$fake\_gun(inl(r)) = False$  and  $fake\_gun(inr(f)) = True$ .

- Non-committal adjectives like *alleged*

- ▶ Use of TT contexts representing beliefs (Ranta 1994)  
 $\llbracket alleged N \rrbracket = \Sigma p:Human. B(p, A_N)$

# Adjectival Modification/More Advanced Issues

- Dealing with additional parameters: grades, temporal arguments
  - ▶ Use of indexed types
    - ★ Basically, CNs with indexed arguments
    - ★ For example, in order to reason about *height* in George is 1.60 tall, one needs to be able to refer to a *height* parameter
    - ★ We define type  $\llbracket Human \rrbracket : Height \rightarrow Prop$
    - ★  $Human_i$  ( $i:Height$ ) stands for humans indexed by  $i$ .
    - ★ Gradable adjectives are defined as taking indexed CN arguments (e.g.  $\llbracket short \rrbracket : Human_i \rightarrow Prop$ )
  - ▶ Different degree parameters are needed (e.g. *height, size, width* or even abstract ones like *idiocy* (for example in he is a huge idiot))
    - ★ Introduce a universe of degrees ( $D$ ) that will contain all degree types
    - ★ All types in the universe are totally ordered, anti-symmetric, reflexive and dense

## Adjectival Modification/An example: *tall*

- We first use the auxiliary object *TALL* and then define *tall* to be its first projection,  $\pi_1$ 
  - ▶  $SHORT : \Pi i : Height. \Sigma p : Human(i) \rightarrow Prop. \forall h_1 : Human(i). p(h_1) \leftrightarrow i < n$
  - ▶  $\llbracket short \rrbracket(i) = \pi_1(SHORT(i)) : Human(i) \rightarrow Prop$
- $n$  is a contextual parameter, the standard value provided by the context
- $\llbracket STND \rrbracket = \lambda A : CN. \lambda i : D. \lambda P : A_i \rightarrow Prop. \exists n_1 : Nat. n_1 = n \wedge i <> n$ 
  - ▶ *short* basically returns the first component of the pair  $SHORT(i)$  of type  $Human_i \rightarrow Prop$
  - ▶ The inference *John is tall*  $\Rightarrow$  *John is taller than the standard value* follows from the second component of  $SHORT(i)$ 
    - ★ Assuming that  $tall(John_i)$  is  $p(h_1)$ ,  $i < n$  follows
    - ★ Similar account for comparatives: Instead of a relation between an  $i$  and the standard, we have a relation between  $i$  and  $j$  provided by two arguments  $Human_i$  and  $Human_j$

# Adjectival Modification/Multidimensional Adjectives

- Quantification across different dimensions
  - ▶ E.g. to be considered *healthy* one has to be healthy w.r.t a number of dimensions (blood pressure, cholesterol etc.)
    - ★ Involves universal quantification over dimensions
  - ▶ The antonyms of these type of multidimensional adjectives existentially quantify over dimensions
    - ★ For one to be sick, only one dimension is needed
- We formulate this idea by Sassoon (2008) as follows:
  - ▶ We define an inductive type *health*
    - ★ *Inductive*  $\llbracket \text{Health} \rrbracket : D := \text{Heart} \text{ — } \text{Blood\_pressure} \text{ — } \text{Cholesterol}$
  - ▶ Then we define:
    - ★  $\llbracket \text{healthy} \rrbracket = \lambda x: \text{Human}. \forall h: \text{Health}. \text{Healthy}(h)(x)$
    - ★  $\llbracket \text{sick} \rrbracket = \lambda x: \text{Human}. \neg(\forall h: \text{Health}. \text{Healthy}(h)(x))$

# Adverbial Modification

- Typing issues: How are we going to type adverbs in a many sorted TT?
  - ▶ Two basic types
    - ★ Sentence adverbs:  $Prop \rightarrow Prop$
    - ★ VP-adverbs:  $\Pi A:CN.(A \rightarrow Prop) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow Prop)$
    - ★ Polymorphic type: Depends on the choice of  $A$
    - ★ Given that we are talking about predicates, depends on the choice of the argument
    - ★  $\llbracket walk \rrbracket : Animal \rightarrow Prop \Rightarrow \llbracket ADV \rrbracket \llbracket walk \rrbracket : (Animal \rightarrow Prop)$
    - ★  $\llbracket drive \rrbracket : Human \rightarrow Prop \Rightarrow \llbracket ADV \rrbracket \llbracket drive \rrbracket : (Human \rightarrow Prop)$

# Adverbial Modification: Veridicality

- Veridical Adverbials when applied to their argument, imply their argument
  - ▶ John opened the door quickly  $\Rightarrow$  John opened the door
  - ▶ Fortunately, John is an idiot  $\Rightarrow$  John is an idiot
- Non-veridical adverbs do not have this property
  - ▶ John allegedly opened the door  $\nRightarrow$  John opened the door

# Adverbial Modification: Veridicality

- We can use a similar organizational strategy as in the case with adjectives
  - ▶ Define an auxiliary object first, define the adverb as its first projection
    - ★  $\llbracket VER_{Prop} \rrbracket : \Pi v : Prop. \Sigma p : Prop. p \supset v$
    - ★  $\llbracket ADV_{ver-Prop} \rrbracket = \lambda v : Prop. \pi_1(VER_{Prop}(v))$
  - ▶ An adverb like *fortunately* will be defined:
  - ▶  $\llbracket fortunately \rrbracket = \lambda v : Prop. \pi_1(VER_{Prop}(v))$
- Consider the following: Fortunately, John went  $\implies$  John went
  - ▶ The second component of  $(VER_{Prop}(v))$  is a proof of  $\llbracket fortunately \rrbracket(v) \Rightarrow v$
  - ▶ Taking  $v$  to be  $\llbracket John\ went \rrbracket$ , the inference follows

# Adverbial Modification: Intensional/domain adverbials

- Use of TT contexts in this case as well
  - ▶  $\llbracket \textit{allegedly} \rrbracket = \lambda P : Prop. \exists p: \llbracket \textit{human} \rrbracket, B_p(P)$
  - ▶ Someone has alleged that  $P$  ( $P$  is an agent's belief context (Chatzikyriakidis 2014; Chatzikyriakidis and Luo 2015))
- Introduction of intensional contexts: Contexts including the intentions (rather than the beliefs) of an agent. We can use this idea for adverbs like intentionally:
  - ▶  $\llbracket \textit{Intentionally} \rrbracket = \lambda x : \llbracket \textit{human} \rrbracket. \lambda P : \llbracket \textit{human} \rrbracket \rightarrow Prop. I_x(P(x)) \wedge \Gamma(P(x))$
- Domain adverbs, e.g. *botanically*, *mathematically*
  - ▶  $\llbracket \textit{botanically} \rrbracket = \lambda P : Prop. \Gamma_B P$
- Intensionality without possible worlds

# The Coq proof-assistant

- An ideal tool for formal verification
  - ▶ Powerful and expressive logical language
  - ▶ Consistent embedded logic
  - ▶ Built-in proof tactics that help in the development of proofs
  - ▶ Equipped with libraries for efficient arithmetics in  $N$ ,  $Z$  and
  - ▶ Built-in automated tactics that can help in the automation of all or part of the proof process
  - ▶ Allows the definition of new proof-tactics by the user
    - ★ The user can develop automated tactics by using this feature

# MTT semantics in Coq

- Encoding MTT semantics based on theoretical work using Type Theory with Coercive Subtyping in Coq
  - ▶ Coq is a natural toolkit to perform such a task
    - ★ The type theory implemented in Coq is quite close to Type Theory with Coercive Subtyping
    - ★ Thus, the TT does not need to be implemented!
    - ★ What we need, is a way to encode the various assumptions as regards linguistic semantics and then reason about them

# Reasoning with NL

- As soon as NL categories are defined, Coq can be used to reason about them
  - ▶ In effect, we can view a valid NLI as a theorem
    - ★ Thus, we formulate NLIs as theorems
    - ★ The antecedent and consequent must be of type *Prop* in order to be used in proof mode
    - ★ Thus, the first can be formulated as a theorem, but not the second:

Theorem EX:(walk) John-> some Man (walk).

Theorem WA:walk -> drive.

# Reasoning with NL

- The same tactics that can be used in proving mathematical theorems are used for NL reasoning
  - ▶ The aim is to predict correct NLIs while avoiding unwanted inferences
    - ★ For example, given the semantics for quantifier *some*, one can formulate the following theorem and further try to prove it

Theorem EX: (walk) John  $\rightarrow$  some Man (walk).

## An NLI example

- Basically, from a sentence like *John walks*, we should infer that *a man walks*
- We formulate the theorem

Theorem EX: (walk) John  $\rightarrow$  some Man (walk).

- We unfold the definition for *some* and use *intro*

EX < intro.

1 subgoal

H : walk John

=====

exists x : Man, walk x

- We use the exists tactic to substitute  $x$  for *John*. Using *assumption* the theorem is proven

## An NLI example

- To the contrary, we should not be able to prove the opposite

Theorem EX: some Man (walk)  $\rightarrow$  (walk) John.

- Indeed, no proof can be found in this case.

- ▶ We unfold *some* and use *intro*

```
EX < intro.
```

```
1 subgoal
```

```
H : exists x : Man, walk x
```

```
=====
```

```
walk John
```

- ▶ From this point on, we can use any of the *elim*, *induction*, *case* tactics but at the end we reach a dead end

```
EX < intro.
```

```
1 subgoal
```

```
H : exists x : Man, walk x
```

```
x : Man
```

```
H0 : walk x
```

```
=====
```

```
walk John
```

# The FraCas test suite

- As already said, the examples involve a number of premises, followed by a question ( $h$ ).
  - ▶ We reformulate the examples as involving declarative forms in Coq (this is a usual approach, at least with deep approaches)
    - ★ In cases of *yes* in the FraCas test suite, we formulate a declarative hypothesis as following from the premise
    - ★ In cases of *no*, we formulate the negation of a declarative hypothesis as following from the premise
    - ★ In cases of *UNK*, for both the positive and the negated  $h$ , no proof should be found. If it is, we overgenerate inferences we do not want

# The FraCas test suite

- Quantifier monotonicity

(3) Some Irish delegates finished the survey on time  
Did any delegates finish the survey on time? [YES]

- ▶ Standard semantics for indefinites *some* and *any* (no presuppositions encoded)

Definition `some := fun A:CN, fun P:A->Prop=> exists x:A, P(x).`

- $\Sigma$  types as dependent record types

Record `Irishdelegate:CN:=mkIrishdelegate{c:> Man;_: Irish c}`.

- These assumptions suffice, the subtyping relation via  $\pi_1$  does the trick here

Theorem `IRISH: (some Irishdelegate(On_time(finish(the survey))))->(some Delegate)(On_time (finish(the survey)))`.

## Quantifier monotonicity

- Monotonicity on the second argument

(4) Some delegates finished the survey on time

Did some delegates finish the survey? [UNK, FraCas 3.71]

- We define the auxiliary object and then *on\_time*

```
Parameter ADV: forall (A : CN) (v : A -> Prop), sigT
(fun p : A -> Prop => forall x : A, p x -> v x).
```

```
Definition on_time := fun A:CN, fun v:A->Prop=> projT1
(ADV(v)).
```

- These assumptions suffice for these cases

```
IRISH2 < Theorem IRISH2: (some delegate)(on_time
(finish(the survey))) -> (some delegate)((finish
(the survey))).
```

# Adjectives

- Affirmative adjectives (these are intersective adjectives)

(5) John has a genuine diamond

Does John have a diamond? [Yes, FraCas 3.197]

- ▶ The  $\Sigma$  type approach will work here

- Opposites

- ▶ Here we need to get:

(6)  $\text{Small}(N) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Large}(N).$

$\text{Large}(N) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Small}(N)$

$\neg \text{Small}(N) \not\Rightarrow \text{Large}(N).$

$\neg \text{Large}(N) \not\Rightarrow \text{Small}(N)$

- The problem is that there are other sizes than a binary opposition *small-large*, e.g. normalized items
- Use this intuition:

```
Definition small := fun A:CN, fun a:A => not (large (a)
/\ not (normalized (a)).
```

# Adjectives

- Some examples that are correctly predicted with the definition given
  - (7) Mickey is a small animal  
Is Mickey a large animal? [No, FraCas 3.204)
  - (8) Fido is not a large animal  
Is Fido a small animal? [UNK, FraCas 3.207)
  - (9) All mice are small animals  
Mickey is a large mouse  
Is Mickey a large animal? [No, FraCas 3.210)

# Overview

- Evaluation against 30% of the suite
  - ▶ Extremely precise (more than 90% in all categories)
    - ★ Full automation via user-defined tactics has been possible
  - ▶ Issue of recall: We have not yet have an automatic translation from the GF parser to the syntax of Coq (the translation was done manually)
  - ▶ In order to have a reliable measure of recall this needs to be done

# Ongoing and future work

- Define a translation from English to Coq sugared syntax (define a Coq concrete syntax in GF)
  - ▶ The syntax we need is a kind of quasi NL
    - ★ For example we need (some man) walks for *some man walks* and (some man) (fast walks) for *some man walks fast*
    - ★ The complexity will come in when Coq unfolds the definitions
- Evaluate against the whole suite or at least a very large fragment
  - ▶ MacCartney has attempted the most until now: approx. 50% of the suite

# Ongoing and future work

- Semi automatic construction of TT semantics: Use of Lexical Network information to extract base types, predicates (Chatzikiyriakidis et al. 2015)
  - ▶ WordNet for lexical semantics information for base types (subtyping, synonyms etc.)
  - ▶ Extract this information into Coq code is not difficult
  - ▶ More elaborate lexical networks can be used
    - ★ We have used a GWAP constructed lexical network, jeuxdemots in Chatzikiyriakidis et al. (2015)
- Entailment approximation?
- Can proof-automation be maintained when going for wider coverage?