

Modern Type Theoretical Semantics: Reasoning Using Proof-Assistants

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Structure of the talk

- Intro to Modern Type Theoretical Semantics
 - ▶ MTT semantics for NL semantics
 - ★ Some test cases: Modification
 - ▶ Inference Using Proof-Assistant Technology
 - ★ Coq as an NL reasoner
 - ▶ Future work

A brief intro to Modern Type Theories (MTTs)

- Type Theories within the tradition of Martin L of
 - ▶ In linguistics, this work has been initiated by pioneering work of Ranta (1994)
- Here, we use one such MTT, UTT, first applied by Luo (2010) to the study of linguistic semantics
 - ▶ Two characteristics that are promising in using MTTs as an alternative formal semantics language:
 - ★ Consistent internal logic according to the propositions-as-types principle
 - ★ Rich type structures

Intro to MTTs-Type Many Sortedness and Rich Typing

- Many-sortedness of types
 - ▶ Use of many types to interpret CNs, *man* and *table*
 - ▶ CNs are interpreted as Types rather than as predicates ($e \rightarrow t$)
- Use of Dependent Types Π and Σ
 - ▶ When A is a type and P is a predicate over A , $\Pi x:A.P(x)$ is the dependent function type that stands for the universally quantified proposition $\forall x:A.P(x)$
 - ▶ Π for polymorphic typing: $\Pi A:CN.(A \rightarrow Prop) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow Prop)$
 - ▶ A is a type and B is an A -indexed family of types, then $\Sigma x:A.B(x)$, is a type, consisting of pairs (a, b) such that a is of type A and b is of type $B(a)$.
 - ▶ Adjectival modification as involving Σ types (Ranta, 1994; Luo, 2010):
 $heavybook = \Sigma x : book.heavy(x)$

Intro to MTTs-Subtyping

- Coercive subtyping

- ▶ Can be seen as an abbreviation mechanism

- ★ A is a (proper) subtype of B ($A < B$) if there is a unique implicit coercion c from type A to type B
- ★ An object a of type A can be used in any context $\mathcal{C}_B[_]$ that expects an object of type B : $\mathcal{C}_B[a]$ is legal (well-typed) and equal to $\mathcal{C}_B[c(a)]$.
- ★ For example assuming $man < human$, $John : man$ and $shout : human \rightarrow Prop$, then $shout(John)$ is well-typed.

Intro to MTTs-Universes

• Universes

- ▶ A universe is a collection of (the names of) types into a type (Martin Löf, 1984).
- ▶ Universes can help semantic representations. For example, one may use the universe CN : *Type* of all common noun interpretations and, for each type A that interprets a common noun, there is a name \overline{A} in CN . For example,

$$\overline{man} : CN \quad \text{and} \quad T_{CN}(\overline{man}) = man.$$

In practice, we do not distinguish a type in CN and its name by omitting the overlines and the operator T_{CN} by simply writing, for instance, $man : CN$.

Modification

- Adjectival modification as involving Σ types, in line with Ranta (1994)
 - ▶ Intersective adjectives as simple predicate types and subsective as polymorphic types over the CN universe:
 - ★ $\llbracket \text{black} \rrbracket : \text{Object} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$
 - ★ $\llbracket \text{small} \rrbracket : \Pi A : \text{CN}. A \rightarrow \text{Prop}$ (the A argument is implicit)
 - ★ For *black man*, we have: $\Sigma m : \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{black} \rrbracket (m) < \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket$ (via π_1)
 - ★ $< \Sigma m : \llbracket \text{human} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{black} \rrbracket (m)$ (via subtyping propagation)
 - ★ $< \llbracket \text{human} \rrbracket$ (via π_1)
 - ▶ For *small man*:
 - ★ $\Sigma m : \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{small} \rrbracket \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket (m) < \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket$ (via π_1)
 - ★ BUT NOT:
 $\Sigma m : \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{small} \rrbracket \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket (m) < \Sigma m : \llbracket \text{animal} \rrbracket . \llbracket \text{small} \rrbracket \llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket (m)$
 - ★ Many instances of *small*: $\text{small}(\llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket)$ is of type $\llbracket \text{man} \rrbracket \rightarrow \text{Prop}$,
 $\text{small}(\llbracket \text{animal} \rrbracket)$ is of type $\llbracket \text{animal} \rrbracket \rightarrow \text{Prop}$

Adjectival Modification/More Advanced Issues

- Privative adjectives like *fake*

- ▶ We follow Partee (2007) and argue that privative adjectives are actually subsecutive adjectives which operate on CNs with extended denotations

- ★ For exaple, the denotation of *fur* is expanded to include both *real* and *fake* furs:

(1) I don't care whether that fur is fake fur or real fur.

(2) I don't care whether that fur is fake or real.

- ★ $G = G_R + G_F$ with $inl(r):G_R$ and $inl(f):G_F$

- ★ Injections as coercions: $G_R <_{inl} G$ and $G_F <_{inr} G$ and we define:

$real_gun(inl(r)) = True$ and $real_gun(inr(f)) = False$;

$fake_gun(inl(r)) = False$ and $fake_gun(inr(f)) = True$.

- Non-committal adjectives like *alleged*

- ▶ Use of TT contexts representing beliefs (Ranta 1994)
 $\llbracket alleged N \rrbracket = \Sigma p:Human. B(p, A_N)$

Adjectival Modification/More Advanced Issues

- Dealing with additional parameters: grades, temporal arguments
 - ▶ Use of indexed types
 - ★ Basically, CNs with indexed arguments
 - ★ For example, in order to reason about *height* in George is 1.60 tall, one needs to be able to refer to a *height* parameter
 - ★ We define type $\llbracket \text{Human} \rrbracket : \text{Height} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$
 - ★ Human_i ($i : \text{Height}$) stands for humans indexed by i .
 - ★ Gradable adjectives are defined as taking indexed CN arguments (e.g. $\llbracket \text{short} \rrbracket : \text{Human}_i \rightarrow \text{Prop}$)
 - ▶ Different degree parameters are needed (e.g. *height, size, width* or even abstract ones like *idiocy* (for example in he is a huge idiot))
 - ★ Introduce a universe of degrees (D) that will contain all degree types
 - ★ All types in the universe are totally ordered, anti-symmetric, reflexive and dense

Adjectival Modification/An example: *tall*

- We first use the auxiliary object *TALL* and then define *tall* to be its first projection, π_1
 - ▶ $SHORT : \Pi i : Height. \Sigma p : Human(i) \rightarrow Prop. \forall h_1 : Human(i). p(h_1) \leftrightarrow i < n$
 - ▶ $\llbracket short \rrbracket(i) = \pi_1(SHORT(i)) : Human(i) \rightarrow Prop$
- n is a contextual parameter, the standard value provided by the context
- $\llbracket STND \rrbracket = \lambda A : CN. \lambda i : D. \lambda P : A_i \rightarrow Prop. \exists n_1 : Nat. n_1 = n \wedge i <> n$
 - ▶ *short* basically returns the first component of the pair $SHORT(i)$ of type $Human_i \rightarrow Prop$
 - ▶ The inference *John is tall* \Rightarrow *John is taller than the standard value* follows from the second component of $SHORT(i)$
 - ★ Assuming that $tall(John_i)$ is $p(h_1)$, $i < n$ follows
 - ★ Similar account for comparatives: Instead of a relation between an i and the standard, we have a relation between i and j provided by two arguments $Human_i$ and $Human_j$

Adjectival Modification/Multidimensional Adjectives

- Quantification across different dimensions
 - ▶ E.g. to be considered *healthy* one has to be healthy w.r.t a number of dimensions (blood pressure, cholesterol etc.)
 - ★ Involves universal quantification over dimensions
 - ▶ The antonyms of these type of multidimensional adjectives existentially quantify over dimensions
 - ★ For one to be sick, only one dimension is needed
- We formulate this idea by Sassoon (2008) as follows:
 - ▶ We define an inductive type *health*
 - ★ *Inductive* $\llbracket \text{Health} \rrbracket : D := \text{Heart} \text{ — } \text{Blood_pressure} \text{ — } \text{Cholesterol}$
 - ▶ Then we define:
 - ★ $\llbracket \text{healthy} \rrbracket = \lambda x: \text{Human}. \forall h: \text{Health}. \text{Healthy}(h)(x)$
 - ★ $\llbracket \text{sick} \rrbracket = \lambda x: \text{Human}. \neg(\forall h: \text{Health}. \text{Healthy}(h)(x))$

Adverbial Modification

- Typing issues: How are we going to type adverbs in a many sorted TT?
 - ▶ Two basic types
 - ★ Sentence adverbs: $Prop \rightarrow Prop$
 - ★ VP-adverbs: $\Pi A:CN.(A \rightarrow Prop) \rightarrow (A \rightarrow Prop)$
 - ★ Polymorphic type: Depends on the choice of A
 - ★ Given that we are talking about predicates, depends on the choice of the argument
 - ★ $\llbracket walk \rrbracket : Animal \rightarrow Prop \Rightarrow \llbracket ADV \rrbracket \llbracket walk \rrbracket : (Animal \rightarrow Prop)$
 - ★ $\llbracket drive \rrbracket : Human \rightarrow Prop \Rightarrow \llbracket ADV \rrbracket \llbracket drive \rrbracket : (Human \rightarrow Prop)$

Adverbial Modification: Veridicality

- Veridical Adverbials when applied to their argument, imply their argument
 - ▶ John opened the door quickly \Rightarrow John opened the door
 - ▶ Fortunately, John is an idiot \Rightarrow John is an idiot
- Non-veridical adverbs do not have this property
 - ▶ John allegedly opened the door \nRightarrow John opened the door

Adverbial Modification: Veridicality

- We can use a similar organizational strategy as in the case with adjectives
 - ▶ Define an auxiliary object first, define the adverb as its first projection
 - ★ $\llbracket VER_{Prop} \rrbracket : \Pi v : Prop. \Sigma p : Prop. p \supset v$
 - ★ $\llbracket ADV_{ver-Prop} \rrbracket = \lambda v : Prop. \pi_1(VER_{Prop}(v))$
 - ▶ An adverb like *fortunately* will be defined:
 - ▶ $\llbracket fortunately \rrbracket = \lambda v : Prop. \pi_1(VER_{Prop}(v))$
- Consider the following: Fortunately, John went \implies John went
 - ▶ The second component of $(VER_{Prop}(v))$ is a proof of $\llbracket fortunately \rrbracket(v) \Rightarrow v$
 - ▶ Taking v to be $\llbracket John\ went \rrbracket$, the inference follows

Adverbial Modification: Intensional/domain adverbials

- Use of TT contexts in this case as well
 - ▶ $\llbracket \textit{allegedly} \rrbracket = \lambda P : Prop. \exists p: \llbracket \textit{human} \rrbracket, B_p(P)$
 - ▶ Someone has alleged that P (P is an agent's belief context (Chatzikyriakidis 2014; Chatzikyriakidis and Luo 2015))
- Introduction of intentional contexts: Contexts including the intentions (rather than the beliefs) of an agent. We can use this idea for adverbs like intentionally:
 - ▶ $\llbracket \textit{Intentionally} \rrbracket = \lambda x : \llbracket \textit{human} \rrbracket. \lambda P : \llbracket \textit{human} \rrbracket \rightarrow Prop. I_x(P(x)) \wedge \Gamma(P(x))$
- Domain adverbs, e.g. *botanically*, *mathematically*
 - ▶ $\llbracket \textit{botanically} \rrbracket = \lambda P : Prop. \Gamma_B P$
- Intensionality without possible worlds

The Coq proof-assistant

- An ideal tool for formal verification
 - ▶ Powerful and expressive logical language
 - ▶ Consistent embedded logic
 - ▶ Built-in proof tactics that help in the development of proofs
 - ▶ Equipped with libraries for efficient arithmetics in N , Z and
 - ▶ Built-in automated tactics that can help in the automation of all or part of the proof process
 - ▶ Allows the definition of new proof-tactics by the user
 - ★ The user can develop automated tactics by using this feature

MTT semantics in Coq

- Encoding MTT semantics based on theoretical work using Type Theory with Coercive Subtyping in Coq
 - ▶ Coq is a natural toolkit to perform such a task
 - ★ The type theory implemented in Coq is quite close to Type Theory with Coercive Subtyping
 - ★ Thus, the TT does not need to be implemented!
 - ★ What we need, is a way to encode the various assumptions as regards linguistic semantics and then reason about them

Reasoning with NL

- As soon as NL categories are defined, Coq can be used to reason about them
 - ▶ In effect, we can view a valid NLI as a theorem
 - ★ Thus, we formulate NLIs as theorems
 - ★ The antecedent and consequent must be of type *Prop* in order to be used in proof mode
 - ★ Thus, the first can be formulated as a theorem, but not the second:

Theorem EX:(walk) John-> some Man (walk).

Theorem WA:walk -> drive.

Reasoning with NL

- The same tactics that can be used in proving mathematical theorems are used for NL reasoning
 - ▶ The aim is to predict correct NLIs while avoiding unwanted inferences
 - ★ For example, given the semantics for quantifier *some*, one can formulate the following theorem and further try to prove it

Theorem EX: (walk) John \rightarrow some Man (walk).

An NLI example

- Basically, from a sentence like *John walks*, we should infer that *a man walks*

- We formulate the theorem

Theorem EX: (walk) John \rightarrow some Man (walk).

- We unfold the definition for *some* and use *intro*

EX < intro.

1 subgoal

H : walk John

=====

exists x : Man, walk x

- We use the exists tactic to substitute x for *John*. Using *assumption* the theorem is proven

An NLI example

- To the contrary, we should not be able to prove the opposite

Theorem EX: some Man (walk) \rightarrow (walk) John.

- Indeed, no proof can be found in this case.

- ▶ We unfold *some* and use *intro*

```
EX < intro.
```

```
1 subgoal
```

```
H : exists x : Man, walk x
```

```
=====
```

```
walk John
```

- ▶ From this point on, we can use any of the *elim*, *induction*, *case* tactics but at the end we reach a dead end

```
EX < intro.
```

```
1 subgoal
```

```
H : exists x : Man, walk x
```

```
x : Man
```

```
H0 : walk x
```

```
=====
```

```
walk John
```

The FraCas test suite

- As already said, the examples involve a number of premises, followed by a question (h).
 - ▶ We reformulate the examples as involving declarative forms in Coq (this is a usual approach, at least with deep approaches)
 - ★ In cases of *yes* in the FraCas test suite, we formulate a declarative hypothesis as following from the premise
 - ★ In cases of *no*, we formulate the negation of a declarative hypothesis as following from the premise
 - ★ In cases of *UNK*, for both the positive and the negated h , no proof should be found. If it is, we overgenerate inferences we do not want

The FraCas test suite

- Quantifier monotonicity

(3) Some Irish delegates finished the survey on time
Did any delegates finish the survey on time? [YES]

- ▶ Standard semantics for indefinites *some* and *any* (no presuppositions encoded)

Definition `some := fun A:CN, fun P:A->Prop=> exists x:A, P(x).`

- Σ types as dependent record types

Record `Irishdelegate:CN:=mkIrishdelegate{c:> Man;_: Irish c}`.

- These assumptions suffice, the subtyping relation via π_1 does the trick here

Theorem `IRISH: (some Irishdelegate(On_time(finish(the survey))))->(some Delegate)(On_time (finish(the survey)))`.

Quantifier monotonicity

- Monotonicity on the second argument

(4) Some delegates finished the survey on time

Did some delegates finish the survey? [UNK, FraCas 3.71]

- We define the auxiliary object and then *on_time*

```
Parameter ADV: forall (A : CN) (v : A -> Prop), sigT
(fun p : A -> Prop => forall x : A, p x -> v x).
```

```
Definition on_time := fun A:CN, fun v:A->Prop=> projT1
(ADV(v)).
```

- These assumptions suffice for these cases

```
IRISH2 < Theorem IRISH2: (some delegate)(on_time
(finish(the survey))) -> (some delegate)((finish
(the survey))).
```


Adjectives

- Affirmative adjectives (these are intersective adjectives)

(5) John has a genuine diamond

Does John have a diamond? [Yes, FraCas 3.197]

- ▶ The Σ type approach will work here

- Opposites

- ▶ Here we need to get:

(6) $\text{Small}(N) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Large}(N).$

$\text{Large}(N) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Small}(N)$

$\neg \text{Small}(N) \not\Rightarrow \text{Large}(N).$

$\neg \text{Large}(N) \not\Rightarrow \text{Small}(N)$

- The problem is that there are other sizes than a binary opposition *small-large*, e.g. normalized items
- Use this intuition:

```
Definition small := fun A:CN, fun a:A=> not (large (a)
/\ not (normalized (a)).
```

Adjectives

- Some examples that are correctly predicted with the definition given
 - (7) Mickey is a small animal
Is Mickey a large animal? [No, FraCas 3.204)
 - (8) Fido is not a large animal
Is Fido a small animal? [UNK, FraCas 3.207)
 - (9) All mice are small animals
Mickey is a large mouse
Is Mickey a large animal? [No, FraCas 3.210)

- Evaluation against 30% of the suite
 - ▶ Extremely precise (more than 90% in all categories)
 - ★ Full automation via user-defined tactics has been possible
 - ▶ Issue of recall: We have not yet have an automatic translation from the GF parser to the syntax of Coq (the translation was done manually)
 - ▶ In order to have a reliable measure of recall this needs to be done

Ongoing and future work

- Define a translation from English to Coq sugared syntax (define a Coq concrete syntax in GF)
 - ▶ The syntax we need is a kind of quasi NL
 - ★ For example we need (some man) walks for *some man walks* and (some man) (fast walks) for *some man walks fast*
 - ★ The complexity will come in when Coq unfolds the definitions
- Evaluate against the whole suite or at least a very large fragment
 - ▶ MacCartney has attempted the most until now: approx. 50% of the suite

Ongoing and future work

- Semi automatic construction of TT semantics: Use of Lexical Network information to extract base types, predicates (Chatzikyriakidis et al. 2015)
 - ▶ WordNet for lexical semantics information for base types (subtyping, synonyms etc.)
 - ▶ Extract this information into Coq code is not difficult
 - ▶ More elaborate lexical networks can be used
 - ★ We have used a GWAP constructed lexical network, jeuxdemots in Chatzikyriakidis et al. (2015)
- Entailment approximation?
- Can proof-automation be maintained when going for wider coverage?